Sunday, May 16, 2010

Part 2: Before European Hegemony

"The Mideast Heartland" examines the processes that enabled the coalescing and provoked the demise of the interdependent thirteenth century world system. Abu-Lughod focuses on the intergration and then disbanding of the Mongol world and the repercussions it had for the northern route; dissects the decimation of the once vital Baghdad-Persian Gulf subsystem; and follows the mounting centrality of the Italian-Egyptian-Red Sea linkage. In the third installment, "Asia," Abu-Lughod suggests that by the time the Portugeuse men-of-war surfaced in the Indian ocean, the stronghold the East had significantly dimnished. "Asia" focuses on the three intertwined susbsystems that were the key participants in the Asian circuit: the westernmost circuit that linked the Arab world to western Indian; the central circuit that connected southeast India to the region bordering the Strait of Malacca; and the easternmost route sandwiched between the straits and China. China's crucial geographic position, when wholly operating as a "frictionless operating system", unified the world trade circuit and illustrated a premodern world system. Yet the economized and disintegrating external system eventually induced "delinking" that led to the decline of China and thus the collapse of the promising premodern world system.

An interesting section resides in "Conclusions." In my previous blog post I wondered if there might be a possibility that the Western hegemony or rather the "Eurocentered 'modern' world system" will persist or be usurped by a possible Asian hegemony/'modern world system'. In "Future World Systems," Abu-Luhod examines idea of an enduring Eurocentered modern world system and suggests that the idea of a a new radical system seems unlikely. She also notes how the development of our world system moved certain countries into core status while others seem to have fallen out entirely. After reading this section, I do think that, though there is the potential for a significantly altered modern world system, the likelihood of this occuring seems unlikely. Abu-Lughod points out that an altered system requires an altered set of rules; I think the reliance and confidence in the rules the Europeans devised in the sixteenth century makes it quite difficult for a new system to emerge.

Though I appreciated Abu-Lughod's dissection of the rise and fall of the thirteenth century world system, I am left perplexed by her notion that there is a possibility that there will be a return to the "relative balance of multiple centers exhibited in the thirteenth-century world system." I feel like there should be an elaboration on this possibility.
-Lolia